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Fight or Flight?  Crime as a driving force in business failure and business mobility 
Abstract 
A growing body of research has documented the consequences of neighborhood crime for a 
myriad of individual, household, and community outcomes. Given that neighborhood businesses 
figure into the link between neighborhood structure and crime as sources of employment or sites 
for neighbor interaction, the present study examines the extent to which neighborhood crime is 
associated with the survival, mobility, and destination locations of businesses in the subsequent 
year. Using business data from Reference USA (Infogroup 2015) and crime data from the 
Southern California Crime Study (SCCS) we assess this question for neighborhoods across cities 
in the Southern California region. We find that in general, higher violent and property crime are 
significantly associated with both business failure and mobility, and that higher crime in a 
destination neighborhood reduces the likelihood that a business locates there. We also present 
findings specific to industries, and discuss the implications of our findings for future research.  
 
Keywords:  neighborhoods; crime; businesses; spatial.  
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Fight or Flight?  Crime as a driving force in business failure and business mobility 
INTRODUCTION 
While a body of research is concerned with the structural and ecological antecedents that 
explain variation in neighborhood crime rates, a smaller set of studies has considered the 
consequences of crime for a range of neighborhood outcomes. Past research has found that 
neighborhood crime is associated with lower or declining home values (Boggess, Greenbaum, 
and Tita 2013; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock 2010; Lynch and Rasmussen 2001; Tita, Petras, and 
Greenbaum 2006); the out-migration of households or neighborhood population loss/turnover 
(Boggess and Hipp 2010; Cullen and Levitt 1999; Dugan 1999; Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum 
2009; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Xie and McDowall 2008); and neighborhood demographic 
transitions (Hipp 2010a; Hipp 2010b; Hipp 2011; Xie and McDowall 2008), to cite just a few 
examples. Perhaps reflecting the tendency of researchers to conceive of neighborhoods almost 
exclusively as residential contexts, less is known about the effect of neighborhood crime on the 
survival and viability of businesses.  
In addition to serving as residential contexts, urban neighborhoods are also characterized 
by their stock of businesses. Businesses serve an important economic function by providing jobs 
to local residents, as well as access to retail and various services. In general,, residents prefer to 
work closer to home, and the presence of nearby retail and service businesses is essential for 
everyday life (Lee, Waddell, Want, and Pendyala 2010; Schirmer, van Eggermond, and 
Axhausen 2014).  Indeed, the New Urbanist perspective argues for the desirability of mixed use 
development in which residents are near services and amenities (Calthorpe 1993; Talen 2002).  
However, the presence of crime and disorder can scare off shoppers, making businesses less 
profitable, and crime may prompt businesses to leave a location (Skogan 1986).   The decline of 
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business activity due to crime can have deleterious effects to the community, and can reduce the 
overall desirability of neighborhoods over time (Skogan 1990b).  Thus, businesses often 
constitute the economic base of a neighborhood, and their closure or out-migration may initiate 
or exacerbate a cycle of decline, which may itself lead to heightened rates of crime. 
Another function for certain businesses is that they serve as spaces for social interaction.  
For example, research finds that businesses characterized as “third places” (i.e. places conducive 
to sociality that are neither home nor work) are associated with lower rates of neighborhood 
crime (Papachristos, Smith, Scherer, and Fugiero 2011; Wo 2016) as they are thought to provide 
the opportunity for interaction between neighbors, which aids in the development of social 
cohesion (Williams and Hipp 2019). Similar in concept to the notion of third places, prior 
research finds that residents report higher levels of collective efficacy in neighborhoods with a 
greater density of “social conduits,” or land use features that “…facilitate interaction between 
individuals and pedestrian activity, loitering and the co-presence of individuals” (Corcoran, 
Zahnow, Wickes, and Hipp 2018).  Other work finds that the businesses that residents frequent 
as part of their regular activity spaces contribute to greater neighborhood collective efficacy and 
intergenerational closure (Browning, Calder, Soller, Jackson, and Dirlam 2017), community 
attachment (Soller, Goodkind, Greene, Browning, and Shantzek 2018), and lower neighborhood 
violent and property crime (Browning, Calder, Boettner, and Smith 2017). Similarly, research in 
the ethnic enclave literature has posited that a clustering of ethnic businesses can help facilitate 
cohesion in a neighborhood, which would be expected to result in less crime, although one recent 
study did not confirm this relationship (Kubrin, Kim, and Hipp 2018).   
Given the importance of businesses for neighborhoods, developing an understanding of 
how crime is associated with the failure and mobility of businesses in the urban context is 
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important not only from the perspective of business owners and their economic interests, but also 
because businesses provide both employment and an opportunity structure for social interaction 
and the development of community assets such as collective efficacy. Therefore, the present 
study assesses the degree to which both violent and property crime are associated with business 
failure (i.e. going out of business) or relocation over a 15 period (2000-14) for neighborhoods in 
the Southern California region.  
Our study makes several important contributions. First, whereas existing research 
typically uses aggregate counts of businesses in geographic units over time—which captures net 
changes in businesses in response to crime—this study uses micro data on specific businesses to 
obtain a more nuanced understanding of the effect of crime on business decisions.  Second, by 
using business establishment-level data (rather than data aggregated to geographic units) we are 
able to distinguish between whether crime results in greater business failure or greater business 
mobility out of the neighborhood, and whether crime impacts where businesses choose to move.  
Third, the existing literature typically aggregates crime to rather large geographic units such as 
zip-codes (e.g. Greenbaum and Tita 2004), whereas the present study utilizes buffers around 
each business location for a more spatially precise assessment of the effect of violent and 
property crime on businesses, controlling for neighborhood socio-demographics. Further, we 
examine this relationship across a number of industries, recognizing that crime may have 
disparate consequences depending on the nature of the business. We discuss our findings not 
only in light of outcomes for businesses, but in relation to the broader implications for the 
neighborhood ecology of crime.  
BACKGROUND 
Crime and Residential Mobility:  
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We draw upon the literature on the relationship between neighborhood crime and 
household mobility to understand the potential impact of crime on business activity and mobility. 
Crime may result in a move out of a neighborhood as the personal experience of victimization 
may serve as an inducement to leave (Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1984). Dugan (1999) finds a 
positive relationship between property crime victimization near the home and moving, although 
there is no effect of violent crime on subsequent moves. The author suggests that this may be due 
to the residents’ perception of future property crime risk increased. Other work suggests that 
perceived levels of crime, fear of crime, and crime-related problems are associated with 
neighborhood dissatisfaction and a desire to move (Skogan 1990a; Skogan and Maxfield 1981), 
and that individuals may alter their routine activities or adopt various protective measures in 
response to a perceived threat of victimization (Keane 1998; Rader, Cossman, and Allison 2009; 
Rountree and Land 1996). A survey of residents who had recently moved found that an 
important reason listed for the choice of a new neighborhood was the crime level and relative 
safety (Percy, Hawkins, and Maier 1995).  Using data from 55 large U.S. cities, Morenoff and 
Sampson (1997) find that crime is the strongest predictor of out-migration. Using a sample of 
127 U.S. cities, Cullen and Levitt (1999) find that an additional incident of crime is associated 
with the out-migration of one resident, with the highly educated and households with children 
most likely to move in response to crime. Other research finds that both victimization and nearby 
crime increase the likelihood of residential mobility (Xie and McDowall 2008), and crime results 
in more vacant units in neighborhoods (Hipp 2010a).   
Another body of research has shown that crime can disproportionately affect who leaves 
neighborhoods, which can result in demographic shifts which may indirectly impact businesses.  
For example, several studies have shown that white households are disproportionately likely to 
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exit neighborhoods with higher crime rates compared to Black or Latino households (Hipp 
2010b; Hipp 2011; Xie and McDowall 2010), and also that white households are 
disproportionately less likely to enter neighborhoods with higher crime rates compared to Black 
or Latino households (Hipp 2010b; Hipp 2011).  If white households tend to have higher income, 
this would also imply a socio-economic transition in the neighborhood that can induce a 
significant change in the business landscape.  Indeed, neighborhood level studies have similarly 
found that higher levels of crime result in changes in the composition of residents based on 
income level (Hipp and Wickes 2016) or racial composition (Hipp and Steenbeek 2016).   
 Thus, findings from research on crime and household mobility or neighborhood 
population loss, and individual responses to crime and the fear of crime, provide insight into the 
ways in which crime might affect business failure or mobility. First, if patrons of businesses 
come to fear victimization around the businesses they frequent due to personal victimization 
experiences there, or simply become aware of nearby crime events, this could be enough 
incentive to alter their routine activities to avoid the business altogether (Skogan 1990b). If the 
business itself has experienced some kind of victimization event (e.g. property crime, or 
employee victimization) and has the resources to move, it may do so to avoid future 
victimization to itself or its patrons and the financial costs associated with crime incidents. Past 
work focusing specifically on the viability of businesses located in high crime areas, generally in 
the inner-city, have outlined impediments to sustaining businesses in such contexts, suggesting 
other potential links between crime and business failure or mobility (Fisher 1991).  A study of 
one community found that rising crime increased fear of crime among residents, and had 
negative consequences for local businesses (Cummings 1998).  Other studies have found that 
crime and disorder can lead to a sense that a neighborhood is in decline, which can have a 
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reinforcing effect on residents’ unwillingness to patronize stores (Steenbeek, Völker, Flap, and 
Oort 2012; Wilcox, Quisenberry, Cabrera, and Jones 2004).   
These same consequences of high crime for the mobility patterns of residents also likely 
impact when and where businesses move. This idea builds on location theory from economic 
geography and regional science, in which the location and relocation choices of business are 
based on various economic and social determinants.  Whereas early formulations of location 
theory focused on the role of economic factors such as labor and transportation costs (Isard 1956; 
Mueller and Morgan 1962), later extensions of this work have considered additional non-
economic features such as quality of life in the destination community (Love and Crompton 
1999).  Indeed, a survey of business owners from firms that had moved in the last five years 
found that the crime and safety of a neighborhood are important for deciding on a new location, 
in addition to other measures of quality of life (Love and Crompton 1999). Studies on 
population-employment interactions also suggest that safety can influence business location and 
relocation decisions via population redistribution, while the literature is not unequivocal with 
regard to the question of whether jobs follow people or people follow jobs (Boarnet, 
Chalermpong, and Geho 2005; Hoogstra, van Dijk, and Florax 2017; Kim and Hewings 2013).    
There are various reasons why firms’ mobility choices would be impacted by local crime 
rates.  For example, locating a business in a high crime context increases the difficulty of 
obtaining insurance and raises its cost (Squires 2003). In addition to the higher cost of insurance, 
Lens and Meltzer (2016) argue that crime could potentially deter customers, reduce demand, and 
increase operation costs as businesses may be compelled to hire security personnel or take other 
measures to protect employees, merchandise, and other property.  The authors also argue that 
specific crimes may be more consequential depending on the nature of the business affected. For 
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example, while violent crime incidents are rarer, they are often more publicized which may deter 
consumers. Conversely, property crimes such as theft are often of more concern to retail 
establishments compared to other types of businesses (Lens and Meltzer 2016).  
Cross-sectional studies of crime and businesses 
 A challenge with understanding the relationship between crime and businesses is the 
possible reciprocal relationship between them.  That is, we would expect that the presence of 
businesses in a neighborhood provides more opportunities for certain types of crime, such as 
robberies, implying a positive causal effect of businesses on levels of crime.  However, past 
research also suggests that higher crime in a neighborhood may have a negative causal effect on 
the number of businesses that locate there.  The implication is that cross-sectional studies that do 
not account for this simultaneity are unable to disentangle these effects, and might obtain 
underestimates of the effects given the countervailing directions of these two effects (Rosenthal 
and Ross 2010).   
Nonetheless, cross-sectional studies have typically found that areas with more retail 
establishments have higher robbery rates (Bernasco and Block 2011; Kim and Hipp 2017).  A 
study found businesses in general are associated with higher rates of burglaries in a cross-
sectional setting (Yu and Maxfield 2014).  In general, researchers have interpreted these cross-
sectional findings as evidence that such establishments drive an increase in crime rates. 
However, Rosenthal and Ross (2010) argue that businesses like retail and restaurants are 
primarily concerned with locating in neighborhoods with low violent crime rates, given that 
violence might scare off shoppers. A study of offenders, however, found that locations with more 
retail establishments were more likely to be targeted for robberies (Bernasco and Block 2009), 
which implies that given the particular context of where retail establishments are located, they 
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will result in higher levels of crime.  These competing perspectives highlight the need for a 
longitudinal perspective, which few prior studies have addressed. 
 Among the neighborhood-level studies that have explored this question longitudinally, 
results are mixed.  A four-year longitudinal study of tracts in Atlanta found the expected 
relationships in both causal directions: tracts with more retail employment experience higher 
violent and property crime rates the following year, whereas tracts with more violent crime in 
one year have less retail employment the following year (although property crime did not show a 
significant effect) (Bowes 2007). Using homicide data for five large cities aggregated to the zip-
code level, Greenbaum and Tita (2004) find that surges in homicide rates in high-crime contexts 
do not have significant effects on subsequent business growth, employment, or the establishment 
of new businesses in retail, personal services, and other sectors. Likewise, the authors observe no 
effect of homicide surges on business closures in zip codes with low and medium homicide rates 
(Greenbaum and Tita 2004). The authors do find that homicide surges are associated with fewer 
new businesses and slower growth in employment among existing businesses, particularly for 
those in the retail/personal service industries with greater effects in low-crime areas. While the 
finding of rather modest effects may be surprising, scholars have argued that they are sensible 
given that some businesses might benefit by operating in high-crime contexts where rents are 
lower, where local residents constitute an accessible pool of labor, and where competitors are 
less likely to locate (Greenbaum and Tita 2004; Porter 1997; Yoon 1997).  
Likewise, Sloan, Caudill, and Mixon Jr (2016) find that the number of burglaries, 
assaults, rapes, and murders in parcels in Memphis, TN between 2009 and 2013 are predictive of 
the count of new restaurant openings in 2014, which they attribute to the economic benefit 
garnered by such businesses despite local crime. In this case, the authors suggest population 
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density is a common predictor of both crime and restaurant location. Another longitudinal study 
found reciprocal effects whereby census tracts with higher rates of violent or property crime had 
less retail employment ten years later, and tracts with more retail employment at the beginning of 
the decade experienced increases in crime over the subsequent decade (Hipp 2010a). Thus, there 
appears to be evidence from these aggregate-level studies that there is a net decline in the 
number of businesses in response to higher levels of crime.  Less research has focused on how 
particular businesses respond to levels of crime.  To address this question, the present study 
assesses the degree to which the relationship between crime and business failure or mobility is 
consistent across types of businesses.  
 To summarize, crime surrounding businesses may affect their survival or mobility by 
increasing the fear of victimization among customers who may in turn alter their routine 
activities and stop frequenting affected businesses, or by raising operating costs through property 
loss, increasing insurance rates, and investments to deter future crime. Just as with residential 
mobility, some businesses are better equipped than others to respond to crime by moving, while 
others may be forced to stay put, potentially leading to a closure or business failure. Those who 
do move will make choices as to where they relocate, which itself may be driven by local crime 
in potential destinations.  Thus, we contribute to this body of research by examining the effects 
of both property and violent crime for the decisions of specific businesses regarding: 1) going 
out of business; 2) moving out of the neighborhood; 3) what new location they move to. While 
past research has generally restricted the industries examined due to data limitations or a 
narrower focus, we extend our analyses to address how this relationship might vary according to 
the type of business, including retail; education/health; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate (FIRE); 
professional; services; industrial, and what Kane and colleagues (Kane, Hipp, and Kim 2017) 
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categorize as “consumer-facing businesses.”  In their definition, consumer-facing businesses are 
ones in which their clientele are consumers, rather than other businesses.  We define the various 
categories of consumer facing businesses in Table A1 in the Appendix.   
 
Data and methods 
Data 
Our study area is the Southern California region, and our sample is all businesses that 
were located in cities for years we had incident crime data.  Our sample includes cities in five 
counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego.  We use data on 
businesses from Reference USA historical data covering the years 2000-2014 (Infogroup 2015).  
We use data on crime incidents from the Southern California Crime Study (SCCS).  In that 
study, the researchers made an effort to contact each police agency in the Southern California 
region
1
 and request address-level incident crime data over as many years as possible covering the 
period 2000-2014. Many of the agencies were willing to share their data for at least some of the 
years. As a consequence, there is crime data covering about 83.3 percent of the region’s 
population in the later years, although there is less coverage in the earlier years of the study 
period. These crime data have been used in several prior studies (Kubrin and Hipp 2016; Kubrin, 
Hipp, and Kim 2016). Finally, we use data on the socio-demographic characteristics of areas 
from the U.S. Census in 2000 and the American Community Survey 5-year estimates in 2008-12.   
Dependent variables 
 The proprietary data from Reference USA (Infogroup 2015) provides annual address-
level information on all businesses located in the Southern California region over the years of the 
                                                 
1
 The region is defined as including five counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego. 
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study.  In each year, we determined if a business located at a specific address in the prior year 
was: 1) still located at the same address (has not failed—gone out of business—or moved); 2) 
still in business but at a different address (has moved); 3) is no longer in business within the 
study region (failed).   
In one set of analyses we included all businesses, regardless of industry.  In additional 
analyses, we used information on the business’ North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code to determine the type of industry the business is in and estimated models based on 
specific subcategories.  We classified businesses using NAICS 2-digit codes into the following 
categories: 1) retail; 2) education/health; 3) Finance, Insurance, real estate (FIRE); 4) 
professional; 5) services; 6) industrial.
2
  In additional analyses, we classified businesses based on 
even finer grained distinctions: these were based on what Kane, Hipp, and Kim (2017) refer to as 
consumer facing businesses (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the specific NAICS 6-digit 
codes).    
Independent variables 
Our key independent variables capture the violent and property crime density in a ¼ mile 
buffer surrounding a business.  We measure all of our independent variables in ¼ mile buffers, 
given evidence that these are roughly comparable in size to Census block groups in this region, a 
unit of analysis often used as a measure of neighborhoods (Hipp and Boessen 2013).  We use 
crime counts rather than rates, given that population size can fluctuate in these smaller buffers 
and lead to instability in the rates; given the constant area of the buffers, we are implicitly 
capturing the crime density based on area around a business.  We classify aggravated assaults, 
robberies, and homicides as violent crimes, and burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, and larcenies as 
                                                 
2
 The 2-digit NAICS codes are: retail (44, 45, 72); education/health (61, 62); FIRE (52, 53); professional (51, 54, 
55); services (56, 81); industrial (22, 31, 32, 33, 42, 48, 49).  
Crime and business closure/business mobility 
 12  
property crimes.  Crime incidents were geocoded for each city separately to latitude–longitude 
point locations using ArcGIS 10.2, and located to blocks. The average geocoding match rate was 
97.2% across the cities, with the lowest value at 91.4%. For the 2.2 percent of events at 
intersections we proportionately assigned them to one of the contiguous blocks. Although we 
have crime data for most cities in the area, there are edge effects in cases when a city is bordered 
by one in which we could not obtain crime data.  In these cases, we computed the crime count 
multiplied by the proportion of the blocks in the buffer that are part of the city with crime data, 
thus providing us with an accurate measure of the crime density for the blocks with available 
crime data.   
We included several control variables that might help explain which businesses go out of 
business in the subsequent year, or which choose to relocate.  At the establishment level, we 
control for the number of employees (log transformed), as larger businesses are typically less 
likely to be shut down.  We also included several ecological measures that capture the area 
surrounding a particular business, constructed as an inverse distance decay of the area 
surrounding a block, row standardized, and capped at ¼ mile such that more distant segments are 
weighted zero.  Given that the business environment nearby is likely important (Glaeser 2008), 
we included a count of the number of businesses (log transformed) in the surrounding ¼ mile 
buffer in that year of our six types defined earlier (retail, education/health, FIRE, professional, 
services, industrial) to take into account agglomeration economies/diseconomies that may exist 
within or across sectors.
3
  We also included quadratic versions of each of these variables to 
capture possible nonlinearities.   
                                                 
3
 Agglomeration effects occur when businesses benefit from location near other firms in the same industry, whether 
through knowledge transfer, reduced transportation costs, or other mechanisms (Glaeser 2008).   
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We also included measures capturing the socio-demographic characteristics of all blocks 
with centroids in the surrounding ¼ mile buffer (with an inverse distance decay).  These 
variables are measured in 2000 (from the Census) and 2010 (from the Census and 2008-12 5-
year ACS estimates), and we interpolate values for the intervening years.  To capture the 
presence of residential population we included a measure of population (logged).  We included 
several measures capturing the socio-demographic characteristics of residents.  We measure the 
SES of the area with variables of average household income and percent with at least a 
bachelor’s degree.4  We control for the racial/ethnic composition with measures of percent 
Asian, percent Latino, and percent black (with percent white and other as the reference 
category).  We measure racial/ethnic heterogeneity with a Herfindahl index of five groups 
(percent white, black, Asian, Latino, and other races).  We constructed a measure of the percent 
households with children.   
The summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses are shown in Table 1. 
<<<Table 1 about here>>> 
Methods 
 We estimated three sets of models as pooled regression models in which we included 
fixed effects for year.  The first two sets of models use binary logistic regression.  In the first set 
of models, the outcome variable is whether or not a business has failed in the subsequent year 
(gone out of business).  This is a 0/1 measure, and the sample is all businesses present in the 
current year.  In the second set of models, the sample is restricted to businesses that have not 
                                                 
4
 For the measures that are only available at the block group level, we need to impute block-level values.  Rather 
than assuming a uniform distribution across the blocks within a block group, as is common, we use synthetic 
estimation for ecological inference as described by Boessen and Hipp (2015) to impute the other variables (Cohen 
and Zhang 1988; Steinberg 1979).  Variables used in the imputation model were: percent owners, racial 
composition, percent divorced households, percent households with children, percent vacant units, population 
density, and age structure (percent aged: 0-4, 5-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-44, 45-64, 65 and up, with age 15-19 as 
the reference category). 
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gone out of business, and the outcome variable is whether the business has relocated to a new 
location in the subsequent year.  In these first two sets of analyses, all covariates are measured in 
the current year, and predict business mobility or failure in the subsequent year.  In the third set 
of models, we are interested in where businesses choose to relocate.  The sample in these models 
is all businesses that relocated during the year, and we use discrete choice models (McFadden 
1978).  The typical strategy when using discrete choice models is to define a set of geographic 
locations in a region (i.e., census tracts), and then build a model in which the location the 
observation moves to (in our case it is the buffer of the business) is given a value of 1, and all 
other locations in the region are given a value of 0.  A logistic regression model is then estimated 
with appropriate covariates in the destination location in the subsequent year (and the current 
year for the origination).  For the control variables, we included measures capturing the socio-
demographic characteristics of the destination, as well as variables capturing the difference in the 
measure between the origin location and the destination location.  In settings in which the 
number of location choices is very large, a strategy shown to yield unbiased results is to draw a 
sample from the total unchosen location choices (Ioannides and Zabel 2008).   
There are two particular challenges we must address for the discrete choice modeling in 
our study.  First, given that we use buffers as units of analysis (which are overlapping), we do 
not have a set of non-overlapping units for the business to choose from.  However, since the 
buffers are centered on blocks, we do have a choice set based on the blocks in the region (and the 
surrounding buffer).  Second, it is not the case that a business can move to any location in the 
region (the same challenge arises even with non-overlapping units, as some units may not be 
zoned for businesses at all or certain types of business activities).  Such units are not appropriate 
to be included in the choice set.  Thus, our strategy is to use only buffers with businesses as the 
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choice set.  We used a random sample of the buffers of 50 businesses in the current year as the 
choice set.  By randomly selecting on businesses, rather than buffers, our approach weights the 
choice set by the number of businesses in a buffer, which we argue more appropriately captures 
the mobility options for a business.   
 
Results 
 We begin with the results predicting the failure of a firm in the following year, and Table 
2 displays the results (all control variables are included in all models, but their coefficients are 
suppressed for clarity reasons, but displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix).  Column 1 presents 
the results for the model predicting the failure of any firm (regardless of industry).  In model 1 
we see that a one standard deviation increase in the level of violent crime in the surrounding area 
increases the odds 3% that the business will be closed in the next year.  In model 2 of column 1, 
we see that a one standard deviation increase in the level of property crime in the surrounding 
area increases the odds 4.3% that the business will stop operating in the next year.  In model 3 of 
column 1 we include both violent and property crime simultaneously, and we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in each of them results in an odds increase of firm failure of 1.8% for 
violent crime and 3.4% for property crime. 
<<<Table 2 about here>>> 
 In columns 2 through 7 we show the results for the subsamples of firms in specific 
industries.  In column 2 for retail firms, we see that property crime has a stronger effect than 
violent crime in models 1 and 2 (3.4% vs. 1.8% odds increase), and in model 3 when including 
both simultaneously it is property crime that drives retail establishment closure.  The story is 
similar for industrial firms, as in model 3 when including both measures property crime has a 
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stronger effect on business failure than does violent crime (3.4% vs. 0.6%).  The pattern is 
different for FIRE firms, as nearby violent crime drives their failure, not property crime.  For 
professional, education/health and services firms, it is both property and violent crime that drive 
their failures.
5
   
 In Table 3, we show the results for the outcome of the mobility of a firm in the following 
year (of all firms that did not fail during the year).  This table contains the same set of models as 
Table 2.  In model 1 we see that a one standard deviation increase in the level of violent crime in 
the surrounding area increases the odds 3.7% that the business will move in the next year.  In 
model 2 of column 1, we see that a one standard deviation increase in the level of property crime 
in the surrounding area increases the odds 2.5% that the business will move in the next year.  In 
model 3 of column 1 we include both violent and property crime simultaneously, and we find 
that a one standard deviation increase in each of them results in an odds increase of firm mobility 
of 3.1% for violent crime and 0.8% for property crime. 
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
 In columns 2 through 7 of Table 3 we show the results for mobility for the subsamples of 
firms in specific industries.  We see that for retail firms, services firms, and industrial firms, it is 
property crime that has the strongest effect on mobility.  In model 3 when including both crime 
types simultaneously, we observe that a one standard deviation increase in property crime 
increases the odds of mobility 5.1% for retail firms and services firms, and 3.3% for industrial 
firms.  A similar increase in violent crime only increases mobility 2.1% for services firms, and 
has no impact on mobility for the other two types of firms.  In contrast, it is violent crime that 
has the strongest impact on the mobility of education/health and professional firms, as one 
                                                 
5
 We also tested for nonlinearity by including quadratic and cubic functions of property and violent crime, and there 
was no evidence that the substantive findings were altered.    
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standard deviation more violent crime increases the odds of mobility 14.9% and 9.5%, 
respectively, for these firms.  Property crime has a weaker effect on the mobility of professional 
firms, and no impact on education/health firms.  Only FIRE firms do not show evidence of 
increased mobility in response to crime, as they are even somewhat less likely to move when 
there is higher property crime.   
Splitting sample based on 32 consumer facing businesses 
  In Table 4, we show the results for the outcome of the failure of a firm in the following 
year when breaking down the sample of retail and service firms (which are more likely to be 
sensitive to socio-demographic changes in the neighborhood) into more fine grained categories.  
These models use the 32 categories of consumer facing firms identified by Kane and colleagues 
(Kane, Hipp, and Kim 2017), and based on the insights of Porter (2003).  These again show three 
models for each sample, containing violent crime, property crime, and both.  A general pattern is 
that failures of most of these types of businesses are impacted by nearby crime density.  We find 
that failures of several of the firm types is primarily driven by property crime: all five retail types 
(general merchandise; apparel; specialty retailing; personal products; home products), limited 
service restaurants, other personal services, religious, social service organizations, deposit taking 
institutions, personal finance, and medical labs.  In contrast, failures of only a few firm types are 
particularly driven by violent crime: beer, wine and liquor stores, repair services, child care, and 
gas stations.  And failures of a few firm types are driven by both violent and property crime: full 
restaurants, health provider offices, auto services, and hair care.   
<<<Table 4 about here>>> 
  In Table 5, we show the results for the outcome of the mobility of a firm in the following 
year (of all firms that did not fail during the year), based on the 32 categories of consumer facing 
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firms.  This table contains the same set of models as Table 4, although there are fewer significant 
effects here.  For a few firm types, mobility is predominantly driven by property crime: general 
merchandise retail, personal products retail, full and limited service restaurants, specialty foods, 
and hair care.  For a few firm types, mobility is primarily driven by violent crime: home products 
retail, beer, wine and liquor stores, other learning, religious, and social service organizations.  
Health provider offices exhibit the peculiar pattern in that although they move more often when 
there is more violent crime, they are in fact less likely to move if there is more property crime.   
<<<Table 5 about here>>> 
Where do firms move? 
 We turn next to the results for the discrete choice models predicting where firms will 
move (based on the sample of all firms who moved in a particular year).  The results are shown 
in Table 6, and the models are based on establishments from the Table 3 samples that actually 
moved (the full results including all control variables are displayed in Table A3 in the 
Appendix).  The first three models for each sample just include characteristics of the destination 
to predict the destination for firms.  For each sample, there are three models (all control variables 
are included in each model): 1) violent crime in the destination; 2) property crime in the 
destination; 3) violent and property crime in the destination.   
<<<Table 6 about here>>> 
 The top panel of Table 6 presents the results for location decisions of all firms.  In model 
1, we see that one standard deviation more violent crime in the destination location reduces the 
odds of a firm moving there 9.9%.  In model 2, we see that property crime has an even stronger 
effect as one standard deviation more property crime in the destination location reduces the odds 
of a firm moving there 12.7%.  Model 3 includes both violent and property crime in the same 
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model, and we see that higher property crime reduces the odds of a firm moving to the location 
9.8% whereas simultaneous higher violent crime reduces the odds 5.1%.   
 The remaining panels of Table 6 show mobility choices for specific types of firms.  For 
retail firms, property crime has the strongest impact on the choice of a destination, consistent 
with our earlier findings from the binary logistic regression analysis for retail establishment 
closure and mobility.  When including both violent and property crime in the model in model 3, 
a one standard deviation higher level of property crime in the destination location reduces the 
odds that a retail firm will move there 20%, whereas violent crime does not have an additional 
effect once taking into account the level of property crime in the destination.  Likewise for 
services firms, property crime has a stronger impact on move location:  higher property crime 
reduces the odds of choosing a location 9.1%, whereas higher violent crime only reduces it 2.8%.  
In contrast, violent crime has a stronger impact on the destination choice of education/health, 
FIRE, and professional firms.  In model 1, higher violent crime in the destination reduces the 
odds of moving there 8.5% for professional firms, 8.7% for FIRE firms, and 6.3% for 
education/health firms.  Industrial firms appear particularly sensitive to crime levels, as their 
odds of moving to a location in model 3 are reduced about 9% for a standard deviation increase 
in violent crime and another 10% for a standard deviation increase in property crime.   
 We briefly consider the results of the control variables (Tables A2 and A3 in the 
Appendix).  More nearby racial/ethnic heterogeneity increases the chances of business failure or 
business mobility.  Greater nearby population density has a particularly strong negative effect on 
business mobility.  The presence of more retail or service establishments nearby is negatively 
associated with business failure or mobility, implying agglomeration effects for these types of 
businesses.  While higher nearby socioeconomic status (particularly measured based on the 
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education level of nearby residents) increases the chances of business failure, it reduces the 
chances of business mobility.  On the other hand, when explaining where businesses relocate, 
there is strong evidence that businesses are more likely to move to locations surrounded by more 
highly educated residents than their prior location, indicating that such residents may be 
desirable as potential customers for firms.  Firms also are more likely to move to locations with 
fewer children and denser population.  There is a strong distance decay effect in where 
businesses move, as the odds ratio of moving to a location that is five miles away are 88.7% 
reduced than moving to a location one mile away; the odds ratios are 97% reduced for moving 
10 miles away, and 99.7% reduced for moving 25 miles away.  This very strong distance decay 
effect also explains why our models predicting where businesses are likely to relocate explain 
much more of the variance (based on pseudo r-square) than those predicting business failure or 
mobility.   
 
Conclusion  
This study has sought to understand the relationship between neighborhood crime and 
business failure and mobility across a number of industries in the Southern California region. 
The findings demonstrate that the ecology of crime near businesses has important consequences 
both for business survival, as well as for business mobility and destination choice.  By using 
spatially precise crime data, and annual business and crime data allowing for proper temporal 
ordering, we were able to demonstrate how crime impacts these business decisions.   
One key finding was that property crime was most important for impacting failures and 
mobility of retail and service firms.  These firms that directly serve customers were typically 
more likely to go out of business in, or move from, neighborhoods with higher property crime, 
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and less likely to relocate to neighborhoods with higher property crime.  Thus, these types of 
businesses appear to be more directly impacted by property crime than they are violent crime in 
most instances.  This was particularly the case for retail firms, as we saw that mobility of all five 
types of retail firms were particularly impacted by property crime in the models estimated for the 
32 types of consumer facing businesses. It may be that property crime is particularly problematic 
for retail firms as there is a concern with theft of their own inventory in such neighborhoods.  We 
also found that industrial firms were similarly most strongly impacted by property crime.  
Although these are not consumer facing firms, and therefore quite different from retail and 
services firms, their distinct production recipe (i.e., a higher percentage of non-labor inputs in 
their production), may in part explain how these businesses consider location decisions.    
A second key finding is that the three broad categories of white collar firms were most 
strongly impacted by violent crime.  Professional firms, FIRE firms, and education/health firms 
were all more likely to go out of business or move out of neighborhoods with higher violent 
crime, and less likely to move into neighborhoods with more violent crime. The negative impact 
of violent crime on these firms may reflect the fact that higher income areas are likely to have 
lower violent crime rates than lower income neighborhoods (Chamberlain and Hipp 2015), and 
thus increasing incidents of violent crime are more impactful.  One possible explanation is that 
workers in these firms are particularly sensitive to violent crime, which would be consistent with 
arguments that violent crime is particularly important for persons’ fear of crime (Zimring and 
Hawkins 1997), as well as their perceptions of crime more generally (Hipp 2013).  An alternative 
explanation is that these firms are more likely to focus on the concerns of their employees and  
clients in their location decision making, and therefore seek out contexts with a lower risk of 
violent victimization.   
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A third key finding was that the relative odds ratios of the effects for crime appeared 
much stronger on where businesses move compared to their decision to move or go out of 
business.  We caution that this is an impressionistic comparison, as these are not directly 
comparable coefficients.  Nonetheless, this is not particularly surprising as businesses in a 
neighborhood may be more reluctant to move despite higher crime rates due to the sunk costs of 
investing in the particular business location and the presence of a long-term lease. In contrast, 
when deciding which neighborhood to move to, businesses have considerably more latitude and 
therefore crime levels may be a particularly important consideration.  These results are analogous 
to earlier research on business owner behavior in neighborhoods undergoing racial transition, as 
white owners were particularly likely to avoid locating in such neighborhoods, but no more 
likely to move out of them (Aldrich and Reiss 1976).  The implication is that existing studies of 
the net change in businesses in a neighborhood due to higher crime rates are likely capturing the 
lower willingness of businesses to relocate to those neighborhoods, and less likely capturing 
movement out of the neighborhood or business failure.  A further issue is new business 
establishments, and although we did not study them here, it is likely that they are also sensitive 
to the crime rates in neighborhoods, analogous to our findings for relocations.  Future research 
will need to test this.   
We acknowledge some limitations to this study.  First, we had limited information on 
business owner characteristics, which may help in understanding such business decisions.  
Relatedly, we do not know the reason that certain businesses close, as this could be due to a 
variety of factors beyond reduced profits, including concern with the direction of changes in a 
neighborhood (Headd 2003).  Second, there may be temporal lags between crime levels and 
business dynamics, or even cumulative effects.  Such possibilities were outside the scope of the 
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current study.  Third, there is always a concern that official crime records from police 
departments do not reflect all crime activity in a neighborhood; although this is certainly the 
case, there is no evidence of bias in the underreporting based on neighborhood characteristics for 
the types of more serious crimes we studied here (Baumer 2002).   
This study has provided key insights by focusing explicitly on business activity in 
response to crime levels in neighborhoods.  A challenge for cross-sectional studies is the 
reciprocal relationship between crime and businesses.  And existing longitudinal research 
typically has focused on how crime levels can change the net number of businesses or 
employment in a neighborhood.  Our study was able to explicitly focus on business activity in 
response to crime levels, providing a particularly clear picture of this process.  Furthermore, we 
were able to utilize a more spatially explicit measure of crime in the nearby ecology, allowing us 
to obtain more valid results.  Our results highlight that violent and property crime have important 
consequences for business survival in neighborhoods, and are particularly important for 
explaining where businesses choose to relocate.  Given the role of businesses as the economic 
base of neighborhoods, as sources of local employment, and as locations which may facilitate 
neighborhood interaction and the development of collective efficacy, we argue that these 
findings are important not only to our understanding of urban business viability, but to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the reciprocal relationship between crime and neighborhood 
change more broadly.
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Tables and Figures 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Percent of firms that failed 13.58
Percent of firms that moved 4.00
Independent variables
Violent crimes 16.08 29.97 15.81 29.36 13.06 26.10
Property crimes 72.19 83.86 71.76 83.36 63.10 79.65
Demographic measures
Percent Asian 12.32 14.25 12.30 14.24 11.77 13.99
Percent Latino 35.16 27.22 35.11 27.21 32.98 26.49
Percent black 6.26 10.45 6.19 10.34 5.82 9.87
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity 1.11 5.13 1.11 5.15 1.34 6.03
Average household income 71.28 44.80 71.30 44.70 73.95 49.87
Percent with a bachelor's degree 31.74 20.92 31.74 20.93 32.14 20.99
Population 10.49 11.12 10.44 11.06 8.31 10.17
Percent with children 32.54 17.11 32.51 17.10 32.89 17.43
Business measures
Logged total businesses 4.34 1.73 4.34 1.73
Logged retail busineses 2.83 1.56 2.83 1.55 42.08 105.32
Logged education/health businesses 2.33 1.59 2.34 1.59 24.34 41.90
Logged FIRE businesses 2.21 1.43 2.21 1.43 32.43 93.33
Logged professional businesses 2.44 1.72 2.44 1.72 22.17 43.93
Logged services businesses 2.56 1.36 2.56 1.36 66.64 266.16
Logged industrial businesses 2.09 1.46 2.08 1.45 30.00 132.17
N 7,340,457 6,056,768 319,075
Sample of all 
firms
Sample of firms 
that did not fail
Sample of firms 
that moved
Models for 
business 
failure
Models for 
business 
mobility
Models for 
where 
businesses 
move
Table 1. Summary statistics for variables used in analyses 
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(3) (4)
Model 1 Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR
Violent crime rate 0.0010 ** 1.030 0.0006 ** 1.018 0.0014 ** 1.043 0.0013 ** 1.040 0.0006 ** 1.018 0.0011 ** 1.034 0.0006 ** 1.018
(19.63) (6.01) (9.08) (7.57) (3.22) (7.42) (5.80)
Model 2
Property crime rate 0.0005 ** 1.043 0.0004 ** 1.034 0.0006 ** 1.052 0.0004 ** 1.034 0.0000  1.000 0.0003 ** 1.025 0.0005 ** 1.043
(25.73) (13.25) (10.57) (6.72) (0.65) (6.61) (8.64)
Model 3
Violent crime rate 0.0006 ** 1.018 0.0001  1.003 0.0009 ** 1.027 0.0010 ** 1.030 0.0007 ** 1.021 0.0008 ** 1.024 0.0002 * 1.006
(10.11) (1.25) (5.31) (5.43) (3.22) (4.85) (2.04)
Property crime rate 0.0004 ** 1.034 0.0004 ** 1.034 0.0005 ** 1.043 0.0003 ** 1.025 0.0000  1.000 0.0002 ** 1.017 0.0004 ** 1.034
(19.43) (11.86) (7.59) (4.18) -(0.64) (3.51) (6.69)
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 7,340,457 businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects for years.  All models include control variables as listed in Table 1.  OR list odds ratio for 
a one standard deviation change in the independent variable
Industrial
Table 2.  Logit models showing effect of violent or property crime on closure of firm for six major categories of establishments
(1) (2) (5) (6) (7)
Retail
Education/ 
health FIRE ProfessionalServicesAll firms
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Model 1 Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR
Violent crime rate 0.0012 ** 1.037 -0.0002  0.994 0.0013 ** 1.040 0.0035 ** 1.111 0.0002  1.006 0.0035 ** 1.111 0.0001  1.003
(10.83) -(0.76) (4.51) (10.94) (0.38) (14.52) (0.40)
Model 2
Property crime rate 0.0003 ** 1.025 0.0005 ** 1.042 0.0006 ** 1.051 -0.0003 ** 0.976 -0.0003 * 0.976 0.0008 ** 1.068 0.0003 ** 1.025
(7.68) (7.43) (6.44) -(2.77) -(2.15) (10.45) (3.64)
Model 3
Violent crime rate 0.0010 ** 1.031 -0.0010 ** 0.970 0.0007 * 1.021 0.0046 ** 1.149 0.0006  1.018 0.0030 ** 1.095 -0.0003  0.991
(8.45) -(3.48) (2.14) (13.13) (1.37) (10.73) -(1.16)
Property crime rate 0.0001 ** 1.008 0.0006 ** 1.051 0.0006 ** 1.051 -0.0009 ** 0.929 -0.0003 * 0.976 0.0004 ** 1.033 0.0004 ** 1.033
(3.84) (8.27) (5.09) -(7.22) -(2.50) (4.16) (3.82)
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 6,056,768 businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects for years.  All models include control variables as listed in Table 1.  OR list odds ratio for a one 
standard deviation change in the independent variable
(3)
Industrial
Table 3.  Logit models showing effect of violent or property crime on mobility of firm for six major categories of establishments
Retail Education/ health FIRE Professional
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All firms Services
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General category
Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR
Retail General merchandise retail -0.0001  0.997 0.0003 1.025 -0.0005  0.985 0.0004 1.034
-(0.28) (1.69) -(0.95) (1.93)
Retail Apparel/retail 0.0001  1.003 0.0002 * 1.017 -0.0001  0.997 0.0002 * 1.017
(0.24) (2.26) -(0.60) (2.33)
Retail Specialty retailing 0.0000  1.000 0.0003 ** 1.025 -0.0003  0.991 0.0003 ** 1.025
(0.24) (4.07) -(1.42) (4.32)
Retail Personal products retail 0.0007  1.022 0.0007 ** 1.060 0.0000  1.000 0.0007 ** 1.060
(1.57) (4.76) -(0.06) (4.50)
Retail Home products retail 0.0008 1.025 0.0007 ** 1.060 0.0001  1.003 0.0007 ** 1.060
(1.87) (4.88) (0.23) (4.51)
Full restaurants 0.0018 ** 1.056 0.0006 ** 1.051 0.0011 ** 1.034 0.0005 ** 1.042
(6.00) (7.29) (3.51) (5.48)
Grocery 0.0010 1.031 0.0004  1.034 0.0009  1.028 0.0002  1.017
(1.78) (1.25) (1.37) (0.54)
Specialty foods 0.0005  1.015 0.0004 * 1.034 0.0001  1.003 0.0003 1.025
(0.87) (2.11) (0.16) (1.93)
Limited service restaurants -0.0005  0.985 0.0003 1.025 -0.0011  0.967 0.0004 * 1.034
-(0.68) (1.65) -(1.36) (2.06)
Movie theatres 0.0016  1.050 0.0006  1.051 0.0007  1.022 0.0005  1.042
(0.79) (1.12) (0.29) (0.84)
Recreational 0.0009  1.028 0.0004  1.034 0.0003  1.009 0.0004  1.034
(0.82) (1.39) (0.22) (1.15)
Alcohol Drinking 0.0008  1.025 0.0004  1.034 0.0003  1.009 0.0003  1.025
(0.69) (0.97) (0.26) (0.73)
Alcohol Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 0.0021 * 1.066 0.0001  1.008 0.0022 * 1.069 -0.0003  0.976
(2.04) (0.11) (2.10) -(0.40)
Alcohol Convenience store 0.0016  1.050 0.0010  1.086 0.0007  1.022 0.0009  1.077
(0.90) (1.51) (0.33) (1.25)
Laundry 0.0005  1.015 -0.0002  0.984 0.0007  1.022 -0.0003  0.976
(0.63) -(0.48) (0.86) -(0.73)
Hair care 0.0024 ** 1.076 0.0005 ** 1.042 0.0021 ** 1.066 0.0003 * 1.025
(5.96) (4.33) (4.68) (2.29)
Repair services 0.0014 ** 1.044 0.0004 * 1.034 0.0012 ** 1.037 0.0002  1.017
(3.72) (2.35) (3.02) (0.97)
Other personal services 0.0009 1.028 0.0004 ** 1.034 0.0005  1.015 0.0003 * 1.025
(1.94) (2.60) (1.04) (2.02)
Table 4. Logit models showing effect of violent or property crime on closure of firm for 32 categories of consumer facing businesses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Violent Crime Property Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
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Schools (elementary and secondary) 0.0003  1.009 0.0001  1.008 0.0002  1.006 0.0001  1.008
(0.24) (0.27) (0.13) (0.18)
Child care 0.0045 ** 1.147 0.0011 * 1.095 0.0043 ** 1.140 0.0003  1.025
(4.79) (2.36) (4.19) (0.57)
Other learning 0.0016 1.050 0.0001  1.008 0.0017 1.053 -0.0002  0.984
(1.67) (0.37) (1.66) -(0.37)
Religious 0.0000  1.000 0.0006 ** 1.051 -0.0007  0.979 0.0007 ** 1.060
-(0.06) (2.64) -(1.20) (2.92)
Social service organization 0.0004  1.012 0.0005 ** 1.042 -0.0001  0.997 0.0005 ** 1.042
(0.95) (2.75) -(0.12) (2.59)
Deposit taking institution -0.0026 * 0.924 0.0002  1.017 -0.0036 ** 0.896 0.0005 * 1.042
-(2.36) (0.91) -(2.95) (2.07)
Personal finance 0.0015 ** 1.047 0.0008 ** 1.068 0.0007  1.022 0.0007 ** 1.060
(3.19) (5.36) (1.41) (4.53)
Healthcare Drug stores -0.0007  0.979 0.0000  1.000 -0.0009  0.973 0.0001  1.008
-(0.61) (0.07) -(0.68) (0.32)
Healthcare Health provider offices 0.0012 ** 1.037 0.0003 ** 1.025 0.0010 ** 1.031 0.0002 ** 1.017
(5.72) (4.84) (4.20) (2.92)
Healthcare Hospital 0.0009  1.028 0.0001  1.008 0.0009  1.028 0.0000  1.000
(0.59) (0.18) (0.56) (0.02)
Healthcare Medical labs 0.0017 1.053 0.0011 ** 1.095 0.0009  1.028 0.0010 * 1.086
(1.73) (2.79) (0.83) (2.33)
Automobiles Auto services 0.0024 ** 1.076 0.0009 ** 1.077 0.0017 ** 1.053 0.0006 ** 1.051
(5.54) (5.68) (3.59) (3.78)
Automobiles Gas stations 0.0029 1.092 0.0000  1.000 0.0034 * 1.109 -0.0004  0.967
(1.86) -(0.05) (2.01) -(0.76)
Transit Transit 0.0047  1.154 0.0033  1.313 0.0004  1.012 0.0032  1.303
(0.64) (1.30) (0.05) (1.14)
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 7,340,457 businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects for years.  All models include control variables as 
listed in Table 1.  Odds list odds ratio for a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.  Separate models estimated for each business type.
Education and 
social services
Financial 
services
Financial 
services
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General category
Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR
Retail General merchandise retail 0.0021 1.065 0.0013 ** 1.113 0.0006  1.018 0.0012 ** 1.104
(1.86) (4.52) (0.45) (4.13)
Retail Apparel/retail -0.0003  0.991 0.0002  1.017 -0.0006  0.982 0.0002 1.017
-(0.43) (1.45) -(0.97) (1.71)
Retail Specialty retailing -0.0010 * 0.970 -0.0002  0.984 -0.0008  0.976 -0.0001  0.992
-(1.97) -(1.42) -(1.56) -(0.75)
Retail Personal products retail -0.0004  0.988 0.0005 1.042 -0.0012  0.964 0.0006 * 1.051
-(0.37) (1.75) -(0.99) (2.01)
Retail Home products retail 0.0031 ** 1.098 0.0003  1.025 0.0032 ** 1.101 -0.0001  0.992
(4.33) (1.07) (4.18) -(0.37)
Full restaurants -0.0014  0.959 0.0007 ** 1.059 -0.0029 * 0.916 0.0009 ** 1.077
-(1.32) (3.25) -(2.57) (4.08)
Grocery -0.0038  0.892 -0.0013  0.899 -0.0028  0.919 -0.0008  0.936
-(1.52) -(1.42) -(1.03) -(0.83)
Specialty foods 0.0026 * 1.081 0.0009 ** 1.077 0.0015  1.046 0.0008 ** 1.068
(2.09) (3.22) (1.13) (2.66)
Limited service restaurants 0.0035 1.111 0.0012 ** 1.104 0.0017  1.053 0.0011 ** 1.095
(1.75) (3.12) (0.74) (2.69)
Movie theatres 0.0018  1.056 -0.0015  0.884 0.6900  #### 0.0337  15.924
(0.42) -(1.27) (0.00) (0.67)
Recreational -0.0040  0.886 -0.0003  0.976 -0.0044  0.876 0.0002  1.017
-(1.55) -(0.44) -(1.52) (0.28)
Alcohol Drinking -0.0081 0.783 -0.0015  0.884 -0.0077  0.793 -0.0002  0.984
-(1.85) -(1.07) -(1.56) -(0.15)
Alcohol Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 0.0042 ** 1.135 -0.0006  0.952 0.0043 ** 1.138 -0.0013  0.899
(3.29) -(0.40) (3.35) -(0.75)
Alcohol Convenience store -0.0041  0.884 -0.0014  0.891 -0.0028  0.919 -0.0010  0.921
-(0.47) -(0.52) -(0.30) -(0.37)
Laundry 0.0025 * 1.078 0.0011  1.095 0.0023 1.072 0.0007  1.059
(2.12) (1.05) (1.88) (0.67)
Hair care 0.0002  1.006 0.0013 ** 1.113 -0.0021 * 0.939 0.0015 ** 1.131
(0.23) (6.44) -(2.07) (6.85)
Repair services -0.0006  0.982 0.0002  1.017 -0.0010  0.970 0.0004  1.033
-(0.64) (0.73) -(0.97) (1.06)
Other personal services -0.0007  0.979 0.0003  1.025 -0.0013  0.962 0.0004  1.033
-(0.64) (0.94) -(1.08) (1.31)
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
Personal 
services
Table 5. Logit models showing effect of violent or property crime on mobility of firm for 32 categories of consumer facing businesses
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Food and 
entertainment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Violent Crime Property Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
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Schools (elementary and secondary) 0.0023  1.072 0.0012 1.104 0.0009  1.027 0.0011  1.095
(1.11) (1.79) (0.38) (1.45)
Child care 0.0006  1.018 -0.0002  0.984 0.0009  1.027 -0.0004  0.968
(0.22) -(0.20) (0.32) -(0.31)
Other learning 0.0049 ** 1.159 0.0009  1.077 0.0047 ** 1.152 0.0002  1.017
(3.21) (1.53) (2.75) (0.26)
Religious 0.0030 ** 1.095 0.0008 * 1.068 0.0026 ** 1.081 0.0004  1.033
(3.42) (2.39) (2.67) (1.11)
Social service organization 0.0021 ** 1.065 0.0000  1.000 0.0025 ** 1.078 -0.0004  0.968
(2.72) -(0.12) (3.04) -(1.30)
Deposit taking institution -0.0014  0.959 0.0003  1.025 -0.0025  0.927 0.0005  1.042
-(0.64) (0.81) -(1.06) (1.21)
Personal finance -0.0002  0.994 0.0001  1.008 -0.0004  0.988 0.0002  1.017
-(0.24) (0.48) -(0.45) (0.61)
Healthcare Drug stores 0.0033  1.105 0.0008  1.068 0.0028  1.088 0.0004  1.033
(1.53) (1.08) (1.19) (0.54)
Healthcare Health provider offices 0.0035 ** 1.111 -0.0009 ** 0.929 0.0052 ** 1.170 -0.0016 ** 0.877
(8.78) -(5.95) (12.25) -(9.72)
Healthcare Hospital 0.0012  1.037 0.0006  1.051 0.0007  1.021 0.0005  1.042
(0.40) (0.63) (0.23) (0.54)
Healthcare Medical labs -0.0001  0.997 0.0011  1.095 -0.0011  0.967 0.0012  1.104
-(0.03) (1.47) -(0.50) (1.57)
Automobiles Auto services -0.0004  0.988 0.0001  1.008 -0.0007  0.979 0.0002  1.017
-(0.46) (0.40) -(0.67) (0.63)
Automobiles Gas stations 0.0011  1.034 -0.0006  0.952 0.0023  1.072 -0.0008  0.936
(0.21) -(0.43) (0.40) -(0.54)
Transit Transit 0.0005  1.015 -0.0029  0.788 0.0000  1.000 -0.0128  0.349
(0.04) -(0.52) (0.00) -(0.11)
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 6,056,768 businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects for years.  All models include control variables as 
listed in Table 1.  OR list odds ratio for a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.  Separate models estimated for each business type.
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
Financial 
services
Financial 
services
Education and 
social services
Education and 
social services
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Total firms Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR Coef (T) OR
Violent crime -0.0040 ** 0.901 -0.0020 ** 0.949
-(24.90) -(11.11)
Property crime -0.0017 ** 0.873 -0.0013 ** 0.902
-(31.11) -(21.59)
Retail firms
Violent crime -0.0045 ** 0.889 -0.0006  0.984
-(11.38) -(1.36)
Property crime -0.0028 ** 0.800 -0.0028 ** 0.800
-(22.91) -(20.08)
Services firms
Violent crime -0.0027 ** 0.932 -0.0011 * 0.972
-(6.18) -(2.18)
Property crime -0.0014 ** 0.894 -0.0012 ** 0.909
-(8.61) -(6.39)
Education/health firms
Violent crime -0.0025 ** 0.937 -0.0022 ** 0.944
-(5.27) -(4.20)
Property crime -0.0006 ** 0.953 -0.0002  0.984
-(3.39) -(0.99)
FIRE firms
Violent crime -0.0035 ** 0.913 -0.0027 ** 0.932
-(5.89) -(3.98)
Property crime -0.0008 ** 0.938 -0.0004 * 0.969
-(4.99) -(2.37)
Professional firms
Violent crime -0.0034 ** 0.915 -0.0031 ** 0.922
-(9.83) -(7.38)
Property crime -0.0008 ** 0.938 -0.0002  0.984
-(6.83) -(1.55)
Table 6.  Discrete choice models showing the effect of violent and property crime in the 
destination neighborhood on the location destination for establishments
(1) (2) (3)
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Industrial firms
Violent crime -0.0056 ** 0.864 -0.0038 ** 0.906
-(14.93) -(8.69)
Property crime -0.0023 ** 0.833 -0.0014 ** 0.894
-(14.62) -(7.84)
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 319,075 businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects 
for years.  All models include control variables as listed in Table 1.  OR list odds ratio for a one standard 
deviation change in the independent variable
Crime and business closure/business mobility 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: NAICS CODES WHICH COMPRISE EACH NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESS TYPE 
Num. Business Category Name 6-digit NAICS Codes (2012 Series) 
1 Apparel Retailing 
448110, 448120, 448130, 448140, 448150, 448190, 
448210 
2 Auto Services 
532111, 441310, 441320, 811111, 811112, 811113, 
811118, 811121, 811122, 488410, 811191, 811192, 
811198 
3 Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 445310 
4 Child Care Services 624410 
5 Convenience Stores 445120 
6 Deposit-taking Institutions 522110, 522130 
7 Drinking Places (Alcoholic Beverages)  722410 
8 Drug Stores 446110 
9 Elementary and Secondary Schools 611110 
10 Full-Service Restaurants  722511, 722513, 722514 
11 Gas Stations 447110, 447190 
12 General Merchandise Retailing 452111, 452112, 452910, 452990, 453310 
13 Groceries 445110 
14 Hair Care Services 611511, 812111, 812112, 812113 
15 Healthcare Provider Offices 
621111, 621112, 621210, 621310, 621320, 621330, 
621340, 621391, 621399, 621410, 621420, 621491, 
621492, 621493, 621498, 621991, 621999 
16 Home Products Retailing 
453210, 443141, 442110, 442210, 442291, 442299, 
444210, 444220, 444130, 444110, 444120, 444190 
17 Hospitals 622110, 622210, 622310 
18 Laundry 812320, 812310 
19 Limited-Service Food and Beverage 722515 
20 Medical Laboratories 339116, 621511, 621512 
21 Movie Theaters 512131 
22 Other Learning 611519, 624310, 611610, 611692 
23 Other Personal Services 
532220, 532299, 541940, 812191, 812199, 812910, 
812990, 541921, 812921, 812922 
24 Personal Financial 524210, 541213 
25 Personal Products Retailing 453991, 446120, 446199, 453910, 453998 
26 Recreational Facilities and Instruction 611620, 713910, 713940, 713950 
27 Religious Organizations 813110 
28 Repair Services 
561622, 811212, 811310, 811411, 811412, 811211, 
811213, 811420, 811430, 811490 
29 Social Service Organizations 
624110, 624120, 624190, 624210, 624221, 624229, 
624230, 813212, 813219, 813311, 813312, 813319, 
813410, 813990 
30 Specialty Food 
311811, 445210, 445220, 445230, 445291, 445292, 
445299, 446191 
31 Specialty Retailing 
451211, 451212, 443142, 451140, 451110, 451120, 
532230, 446130, 453220, 453110, 448310, 448320, 
451130 
32 Transit 485111, 485112, 485113, 485119, 485410, 485991 
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Number of employees -0.4522 ** 0.0907 **
-(331.65) (46.88)
Characteristics of buffer
Violent crime rate 0.0006 ** 0.0010 **
(10.11) (8.45)
Property crime rate 0.0004 ** 0.0001 **
(19.43) (3.84)
Percent Asian 0.0012 ** -0.0024 **
(13.59) -(14.69)
Percent Latino 0.0017 ** -0.0022 **
(22.53) -(16.06)
Percent black 0.0038 ** -0.0044 **
(32.62) -(18.43)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity 0.0005 * 0.0010 **
(2.33) (2.60)
Average household income 0.0001 * -0.0004 **
(2.32) -(5.68)
Percent with a bachelor's degree 0.0013 ** -0.0011 **
(13.85) -(6.18)
Population -0.0007 ** -0.0116 **
-(5.31) -(41.58)
Percent with children -0.0005 ** -0.0007 **
-(4.73) -(3.85)
Logged retail businesses -0.0035  0.0216 **
-(0.82) (2.82)
Logged retail businesses squared -0.0050 ** -0.0145 **
-(6.63) -(10.32)
Logged education/health businesses -0.0249 ** -0.0393 **
-(8.28) -(7.27)
Logged education/health businesses squared 0.0036 ** 0.0139 **
(7.42) (16.28)
Logged FIRE businesses -0.0389 ** -0.0098  
-(9.54) -(1.30)
Logged FIRE businesses squared 0.0093 ** 0.0133 **
(10.01) (7.78)
Table A2.  Logit models predicting death of firm, or mobility of firm, for all types 
of businesses
Business 
failure
Business 
mobility
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Logged professional businesses 0.0472 ** 0.1374 **
(15.04) (23.30)
Logged professional businesses squared -0.0039 ** -0.0168 **
-(8.08) -(18.38)
Logged services businesses -0.0138 ** -0.1592 **
-(2.93) -(18.69)
Logged services businesses squared -0.0091 ** 0.0072 **
-(9.57) (4.07)
Logged industrial businesses 0.0333 ** 0.0138 *
(10.70) (2.39)
Logged industrial businesses squared 0.0015 ** 0.0081 **
(2.76) (7.69)
Intercept -2.7862 ** -3.7081 **
-(219.04) -(190.70)
N 7,059,073 6,100,327
BIC 5,402,056 2,019,604
Pseudo r-square 0.037 0.015
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. Pooled models with fixed 
effects for years.  
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Violent crime -0.0020 **
-(11.11)
Property crime -0.0013 **
-(21.59)
Percent Asian -0.0142 ** 0.0084 **
-(51.92) (31.47)
Percent Latino -0.0154 ** 0.0091 **
-(66.80) (42.55)
Percent black -0.0170 ** 0.0105 **
-(46.15) (28.72)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity -0.0097 ** 0.0035 **
-(10.51) (4.78)
Average household income 0.0007 ** -0.0003 **
(5.69) -(3.02)
Percent with a bachelor's degree -0.0117 ** 0.0074 **
-(36.46) (28.34)
Population -0.0057 ** 0.0107 **
-(12.87) (29.23)
Percent with children 0.0118 ** -0.0081 **
(37.82) -(32.35)
Number of retail firms -0.0006 ** 0.0885 **
-(5.09) (9.81)
Number of education/health firms -0.0016 ** 0.0843 **
-(35.76) (25.25)
Number of FIRE firms -0.0010 ** 0.0263
-(4.99) (1.65)
Number of professional firms -0.0001 ** 0.0287 **
-(4.02) (13.06)
Number of services firms -0.0001  -0.1232 **
-(0.59) -(6.47)
Number of industrial firms -0.0002 * 0.0102
-(2.07) (1.70)
Characteristics 
of destination 
buffer
Difference 
(a)
Table A3.  Logit models predicting relocation choice of firm, for all 
types of businesses
Crime and business closure/business mobility 
 41  
 
 
 
Logged distance -1.6124 **
-(307.71)
Logged distance squared -0.1479 **
-(40.04)
Logged distance cubed 0.0039 **
(4.12)
Crossed city boundary -0.7042 **
-(99.72)
Intercept 1.4650 **
(51.28)
BIC 878,674
Pseudo R-square 0.607
(a): difference between origination and destination buffer
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05.  T-values in parentheses. N= 16,272,808 
businesses.  Pooled models with fixed effects for years.  
